September 27, 2025
According to exclusive sources from newspapers such as Reuters, and MUC News as well as unofficial sources, it is likely that General Secretary To Lam and his entourage are expected to make an official visit to North Korea in October to become the first high-ranking Vietnamese leader to set foot in Pyongyang for over 20 years. If this information turns out to be true, this will not just be a normal trip, but a “move” with many layers of meaning both inside and outside the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV).
Kim Jong-un and To Lam
Historical background of Vietnam-North Korea relations
Vietnam-North Korea relations have a foundation from the period of resistance against the US, when the two sides regularly exchanged delegations and provided aid to each other. Pyongyang once provided political and military support to Hanoi. On the contrary, Vietnam once considered North Korea as one of its strategic partners in terms of ideology.
However, after Rennovation (1986), Hanoi gradually expanded relations with the West, especially the US and ASEAN countries, while North Korea became increasingly isolated because of its nuclear program. Since then, Vietnam-North Korea relations have more or less fallen into a state of indifference. General Secretary Nong Duc Manh’s visit to Pyongyang in 2007 was an effort to restore the relationship, but did not create many breakthroughs.
A surprising move but not a coincidence
It is worth remembering that the last time a high-ranking Vietnamese leader visited North Korea was in 2007, when General Secretary Nong Duc Manh made an official visit. Since then, Vietnam-North Korea relations have existed more on paper than in substance: no trade, no major cooperation, only maintaining a minimum level of diplomatic diplomacy in the style of “socialist brotherhood.” Therefore, the fact that incumbent General Secretary To Lam chose to go to Pyongyang during this time has caused a lot of speculation among observers.
In addition, if we do not count the visit of Vietnamese leaders to North Korea, but if we count backwards, the last time the North Korean leader visited Vietnam was when Kim Jong Un visited Vietnam to attend the US-North Korea Summit in 2019 until now, which means it has been too “long, far away”, but that is not called a visit in the “true sense” but only called “combination” because Kim Jong Un and US President Trump came to Hanoi to attend the summit and mainly negotiate with each other.
Some inside sources believe that this is To Lam’s effort to assert his personal prestige, especially in the context of the party quietly redistributing power for the 14th National Congress period which will take place at the end of this year or early next year. In that fierce race, every trip, every handshake is a signal sent both domestically and internationally.
What does North Korea need from Vietnam?
North Korea, which is completely isolated, is craving any image that proves it is “not alone.” A high-level visit from Hanoi will help Pyongyang gain more diplomatic cards before China, Russia, and even South Korea. In particular, the fact that an ASEAN country that is friendly with the US but still maintains relations with China like Vietnam chooses to visit Pyongyang will be used by North Korea as “living proof” for the argument that it still has room for dialogue in the region.
Overseas analysts commented that North Korea does not need much from Vietnam — no large aid, no large-scale trade — what it needs is recognition, a trip to prove that Pyongyang is still present on the world political map.
What is Hanoi calculating?
On the other hand, Vietnam is in a difficult position. On the one hand, Hanoi wants to maintain warm relations with Washington and Seoul, especially after the Vietnam-US relationship was upgraded to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.” On the other hand, it cannot displease Beijing, especially when China considers North Korea a “strategic buffer zone.”
To Lam’s visit to Pyongyang can therefore be considered a balanced card: sending a signal to China that Vietnam is not leaning towards the US, while keeping a distance so as not to be accused of being an “extension” of Beijing.
But behind it is also a personal calculation: for a leader who was once associated with the public security sector and is believed to have ambitions to consolidate long-term power, a visit with a “different” diplomatic color will help build the image of a brave, independent leader who is not afraid of being scrutinized by the West.
The risk is not small
However, the “North Korea card” also contains many risks. First, the US and South Korea will closely monitor every statement and image from the trip. Just one out-of-sync statement is enough to make Hanoi suspicious. Second, internally, many factions may take this opportunity to attack that To Lam is “polishing himself” rather than serving the common interest.
It is worth noting that Reuters emphasized: the two countries do not have significant trade relations. That means, if any agreements are signed, they will only be at the level of symbolic documents. That makes the trip more likely to be seen by public opinion as a “political performance” rather than a real diplomacy.
The hidden message?
Insiders in Hanoi have been buzzing on social media for the past few days that this trip could be used as a “shield” because General Secretary To Lam wants to prove that he is capable enough to bring Vietnam into dialogue with even the most difficult partners, thereby strengthening his personal reputation before personnel decisions.
There is also a stream of opinions that this is a test for Vietnam to find its own place in the increasingly tense geopolitical competition: not only wanting to be “the person standing between the US and China” but also trying the role of “the connector” between isolated countries and the international community.
Whatever the ultimate purpose is, if the visit really takes place, it will immediately put Vietnam in the center of international media attention. But as usual, when big questions are asked, the answers often lie in the darkness of closed meeting rooms in Ba Dinh.
In politics, especially for figures like To Lam, each trip is never simply a trip. And Pyongyang this time, it may not only be the destination — but also a mirror reflecting the complex power calculations within the CPV.
Pyongyang may want to use that visit to create the image of an “international diplomatic address” in isolation. Hanoi may want to emphasize its independence in foreign policy choices.
But if everything is just at the level of a “historic meeting,” then the information leaked before the announcement is the most sensitive point: who wants to spread it? Which agency reveals it? That is still a very big question mark.
Hoang Nam – Thoibao.de
