On August 30, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh handed over the decision to accept Le Hoai Trung from the Party Central Office to work at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, holding the position of acting minister.
With this decision, Trung will replace Bui Thanh Son, who held both the positions of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs since August 2024 until now.
At first glance, this is an administrative personnel adjustment. But according to political observers, this move reveals many important mysteries in the power struggle ahead of the 14th Party National Congress slated in early January next year.
According to international observers, the transfer of Le Hoai Trung back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took place just a few days after Tran Luu Quang was brought back to hold the position of Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh City Party Committee.
This reflects the goal of incumbent General Secretary To Lam to rearrange the entire personnel chessboard, aiming to reduce the influence of personnel considered unfriendly or opposing.
In terms of foreign affairs, this change is even more notable because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is considered the “backyard” of the late General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, with veteran faces such as Bui Thanh Son as an example.
According to insiders, this change is not only related to the usual personnel issue, but in fact, Bui Thanh Son has had disagreements with party chief To Lam in the past.
The hottest point is that To Lam is increasingly directly intervening in the field of foreign affairs, a field that is considered to be under the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Informed sources said that recently, Bui Thanh Son expressed dissatisfaction when To Lam arbitrarily carried out personal diplomatic activities. A typical example is the phone call with US President Donald Trump without the official consultation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This move is considered to “overwhelm the authority” and reduce the traditional role of this ministry.
The replacement of Bui Thanh Son with Le Hoai Trung is therefore considered a strategic move, aiming to remove a person who is creating obstacles, and at the same time to strengthen the ability to control the foreign affairs in the orbit that To Lam desires.
Moreover, this personnel change also reflects another reality: the position and power of the Military faction, as well as groups that do not support To Lam, are significantly weakening.
Previously, in April 2025, after the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee, there were speculations about the possibility of General Phan Van Giang becoming State President. However, according to the latest informed sources, the scenario of Nguyen Thi Anh Xuan, incumbent Vice President, being nominated for this position is more feasible.
The reason is that, according to the current law of power distribution, it is unlikely that the Military faction will hold the position of State President for two consecutive terms. Meanwhile, Anh Xuan is already in the planning for a member of the Politburo and the Secretariat.
And even though she does not meet the criteria for “a full term in the Politburo” according to convention, she can still be considered by the General Secretary as “special” if the Central Committee decides.
This also means that the Military faction, although once expected to create a counterweight to To Lam’s Police faction, is gradually losing the opportunity to play a central role in the leadership of the “four pillars.”
From a strategic perspective, the above moves have shown that General Secretary To Lam is persistently “consolidating” to gradually put close personnel into the most key positions in the Party and State apparatus.
As key personnel are gradually redeployed, a picture of a new political chessboard is taking shape: To Lam and the Police faction are increasingly dominating, while opposing factions, from the Army to late Nguyen Phu Trong’s conservative faction, are clearly weakening.
Tra My – Thoibao.de
